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Abstract: The study objective is aimed at finding the relationship between corporate governance bank 
distress in deposit money banks. The research design adopted in this paper is the case study method, in other 
to have an intensive insight of the subject matter. Primary data was used specifically the survey technique. 
The method that was used in the presentation of data in this study is the Statistical Package for Social Sci-
ences (SPSS) which contains all the necessary and important statistical technique for data analysis. For 
testing the hypothesis, correlation analysis which measures the degree of relationship between variables was 
used to analyze the result generated from the questionnaire. The evidence shows that corporate governance 
has no significant improvement on the prevention of bank distress but has significantly improved the per-
formance of the Nigerian banking sector. We therefore recommend that banks should demonstrate strong 
internal policies to identify and manage conflict of interest and zero tolerance posture against cases of un-
sound corporate governance practices.
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1. introduction
The Organization of Economic 
Corporation and development (OECD) paper 
defines corporate governance as involving 
“a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders, and 
other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and manage-
ment to pursue objectives that are in the in-
terests of the company and shareholders and 
should facilitate effective monitoring, there-
by encouraging firms to use resources more 
efficiently”. Corporate governance in recent 
years assumed considerable significance as a 
veritable tool for ensuring corporate surviv-
al since business confidence usually suffers 
each time a corporate entity collapses. Most 
of the business failures in recent past are at-
tributed to failure in corporate governance 
practices. For instance, the collapse of banks 
in Nigeria in the early 1990’s and onwards 
was as a result of inadequate corporate gov-
ernance practices such as insider-related 
credit abuses and poor risk appreciation and 
internal control system failure. 
Corporate governance refers to the or-
ganizational framework for decision making 
and action taking within a corporate entity. 
In this regard, it can also be defined as the 
structure of relationships within an entity 
for making decisions and implementations. 
Simply put, it refers to how an organization 
is run, that is, how the resources of an or-
ganization are employed in pursuant of the 
set missions and goals of the organization. 
Hussey (1999) as cited in Ivior (2008) defines 
corporate governance more formally as “the 
manner in which organizations, particular-
ly limited companies, are managed and the 
nature of accountability of the managers to 
the owners”. In other words, corporate gov-
ernance is not just a set of rules but also a 
structure of relationships geared towards 
establishing good corporate practice and 
culture. The ultimate Business Dictionary 
(2003) as cited in Sani (2010) defines corpo-
rate governance functionally as the manage-
rial or directional control of an incorporated 
organization, which, when well practiced can 
reduce the risk of fraud, improve company 
performance and leadership and demon-
strate social responsibility. Essentially, cor-
porate governance is focused on controlling 
the activities of those in whose custody the 
resources of an organization are entrusted 
with a view to protecting the interest of the 
resource owners.
Wise and Mahboob Ali (2009) opined 
that “corporate governance indicates the 
policies and procedures applied by firms to 
attain certain sets of objectives, corporate 
missions and visions with regard to stock-
holders, employees, customers, suppliers and 
different regulatory agencies and the com-
munity at large”. Effective corporate gover-
nance practices are essential to achieving and 
maintaining public trust and confidence in 
the banking system, which are critical to the 
functioning of the banking sector and econ-
omy as a whole. Poor corporate governance 
may contribute to bank failures, which can 
pose significant public costs and consequenc-
es due to inability of a bank to manage its as-
sets and liabilities, including deposits, lost of 
confidence and in turn trigger a bank run or 
liquidity crisis.
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Oyediran (2003) as cited in Babalola 
(2010) posits that corporate governance is 
the way and manner in which the affairs of 
companies are conducted by those charged 
with that duty. In Nigeria, the governance 
of a limited liability company is the respon-
sibility of its board of directors. Corporate 
governance is characterized by transparency, 
accountability, probity and the protection of 
stakeholders’ rights. Corporate governance 
refers to the manner in which the power of a 
corporation is exercised in the management 
of its total portfolio of economic and socio 
resources with the aim of increasing share-
holders’ value and safeguarding the interest 
of other stakeholders in the content of its cor-
porate mission. 
The above definitions are summarized 
into one by the Report of the Committee on 
Corporate Governance of Public Companies 
in Nigeria (2003) as cited in Sani (2010) which 
sees corporate governance as “the system by 
which companies in Nigeria are directed, and 
managers are held accountable for the per-
formance of the organization.” This further 
emphasizes the fact that the concept of cor-
porate governance is principally on the struc-
ture of relationship within an organization 
which is directed at best practice in the over-
all interest of the organization and its own-
ers/stakeholders with the sole aim of curbing 
distress in the  Nigeria banking system.
In ordinary parlance, distress connotes 
being in danger or difficulty and in need of 
help. A bank is distressed when it is techni-
cally insolvent implying that the bank’s lia-
bilities exceed the assets. The terms distress 
connotes “unhealthy situation” or a state 
of inability or weakness, which prevents 
the achievement of set goals and aspiration 
(Ologun, 1994). Benston et al, (1986) as cited 
in Sani (2010) defines distress as a situation 
of complete loss of shareholder funds. To 
evolve a working definition of distress, it is 
desirable to synthesize those factors that will 
the unhealthy as well as state some broad set 
obligation and aspiration of a typical finan-
cial institution. A financial institution is de-
scribed as unhealthy, if it is unable to meet 
its obligation to owners and the economy oc-
casioned by severe financial, operational and 
managerial weaknesses (Ologun, 1994).  To 
Elebuta (1999), distress occurs when a fairly 
reasonable proportion of banks in the bank-
ing sector are unable to meet their obligation 
to customers, owners and the economy, as a 
result of weakness in the financial, operation-
al and managerial capabilities which renders 
them either illiquid or insolvent.
The Nigerian banking sector witnessed 
dramatic growth post –consolidation. Banks 
began to grow in size and numbers and even 
diversified across the shores of the country 
with branches and subsidiaries. However, 
neither the industry nor the regulators were 
sufficiently prepared to sustain and monitor 
the sector’s explosive growth. Prevailing sen-
timents and economic orthodoxy all encour-
aged this rapid growth, creating a blind spot 
to risks building up in the system. Prior to the 
crisis, the sentiment in the industry was that 
the banking sector was sound and growth 
should be encouraged. The international 
monetary fund (IMF) endorsed the strength 
of the banking system to support this growth. 
However, this sentiment proved misplaced. 
Among the many interdependent factors that 
led to creation of an extremely fragile finan-
cial system is failure in corporate governance 
at banks. Consolidation created bigger banks 
but failed to overcome the fundamental 
weaknesses in corporate governance in many 
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of these banks. 
The problem in the Nigerian banking 
industry pre-post consolidation has been 
that of risk management arising from accu-
mulation of huge non-performing accounts. 
This is as result of non-application of the five 
‘C’ of lending – Character, Capacity, Capital, 
Condition and Collateral. The banking in-
dustry experienced misuse of shareholders 
funds, governance malpractice, unchecked 
at consolidation. For instance, a large part of 
the sector enriched themselves at the expense 
of many depositors and investors. Corporate 
governance in many banks failed because 
boards ignored governance practices to the 
extent executive management obtained for 
themselves un-secured loans at the expense 
of the depositors and they did not have the 
boldness to enforce good governance. In 
addition, the audit process at all banks ap-
peared not to have taken fully into account 
the rapid deterioration of the economy and 
hence the need for aggressive provisioning 
against risk and assets.
As banks grew in size and complexity, 
bank boards often did not fulfill their func-
tion and were lulled into a sense of well-be-
ing by the apparent year-over-year growth in 
assets and profits. In hindsight, boards and 
executive management in some major bank 
were not equipped to run their institutions. 
The bank chairman/CEO often had an over-
bearing influence on the board, and some 
boards lacked independence; directors often 
fail to make meaningful contributions to safe 
guard the growth and development of the 
bank and had weak ethical standards: the 
board committees were also often ineffective 
or dormant. Chief executive officers (CEO’s) 
lend money to themselves for stock price ma-
nipulation and other activities in variance 
with corporate governance. A review of the 
prevailing situation in the Nigerian bank-
ing industry shows that most banks are yet 
to embrace practices that will ensure good 
corporate governance in their institutions. 
Good governance practices results in higher 
firm’s market value, lower cost of funds and 
higher profitability (Black, Jang & Kin, 2006 
& Claessens, 2006). 
According to Chiejina (2009), “the ex-
ecutive of banks had abandoned the key 
elements of good corporate principles of 
honesty, trust, and integrity, openness, per-
formance orientation, responsibility and 
accountability, mutual respect and commit-
ment to the organization for selfish reasons”. 
The core banking practices have been traded 
off and the most beneficial are the CEOs and 
their loyalist. Eight chief executives and ex-
ecutive directors of some Nigerian banks 
were dismissed between August and October 
2009 due to issues related to poor corporate 
governance practices. This was the outcome 
of audit investigations embarked upon by 
the Central Bank of Nigeria to determine the 
soundness of Nigerian banks. Hence, this pa-
per is poised to examine the role of corporate 
governance practice in relation to bank dis-
tress in Nigerian deposit money banks (for-
merly known as commercial banks). It is also 
aimed at finding the relationship between 
good governance and better performance of 
banks. Based on the objectives and focus of 
this study the hypotheses formulated were:
 H1: There is no significant relationship 
between good corporate governance and pre-
vention of bank distress
H2: There is a significant relationship 
between practice of good corporate gover-
nance and better performance of banks.
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 It is pertinent to note that the under-
standing of corporate governance will in-
crease growth rate, increase efficiency of 
their activities and minimize risks, improve 
standard of lending, strengthen their reputa-
tion and raise the level of investors and cli-
ents trust and attract strategic investors. The 
remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. 
In section two a review of relevant literature 
in the area of corporate governance and dis-
tress is examined. In section three, an expla-
nation of the methodology is provided. The 
empirical evidence of this paper is discussed 
in section four. Lastly, the paper ends conclu-
sion and recommendation.
2. review of related literature 
Iyang (2009) conclude in his findings 
on  nurturing corporate governance system: 
emerging trends  in Nigeria, concluded that 
major challenges which require urgent atten-
tion to enhance the effectiveness of the system 
were noted “making voluntary codes manda-
tory; developing more effective mechanisms 
for monitoring compliance and enforcement; 
developing strong internal control mecha-
nisms to checkmate the boards oversight re-
sponsibility; crafting strategies to enhance 
shareholders activism and the extension of 
the codes to state-owned enterprises with 
more cases of corporate abuses”. The SEC 
Code of Best Practice for Public Companies 
in Nigeria is voluntary and is designed to 
entrench good business practices and stan-
dards for all listed companies, including 
banks. The mandatory corporate governance 
provisions relating to banks are contained 
in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) 1990, the Banks and other Financial 
Institutions Act (BOFIA) 1999, the investments 
and Securities Act 1999.The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Act (SECA) 1988 (and 
its accompanying Rules and Regulations, the 
Code of Conduct for Directors of licensed 
Banks and Financial Institutions (approved 
by the Bankers’ Committee in 2003) and 
Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in 
Nigeria Post Consolidation issued by CBN 
in 2006. Compliance with the provisions of 
these codes is compulsory.
The impetus for the development of 
corporate governance system in Nigeria also 
came through the activities of the Nigeria 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
In 2001, the SEC set up the Atedo Peterside 
committee to identify weaknesses in the 
current corporate governance practices in 
Nigeria with respect to public companies and 
make recommendations on the necessary 
changes therein. A Code of Best Practices 
for Public companies in Nigeria was adopt-
ed (SEC, 2003).The code is voluntary and is 
designed to entrench good business prac-
tices and standards for boards and directors, 
CEOs, auditors, etc., of listed companies, in-
cluding banks.
A major development in the history of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is the recent 
intervention by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN).The incessant collapse experienced 
in the banking sector due to poor corporate 
governance and the recent bank consolida-
tion exercise forced the CBN to issue new 
corporate governance guidelines to all banks 
operating in the country in Febraury 2006. 
Known as Central Bank of Nigeria Code for 
Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria 
Post Consolidation (CBN, 2006), the code 
seeks to address the issues of poor corporate 
governance and create a sound banking sys-
tem in Nigeria. The code introduced more 
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stringent requirements in the area of indus-
try transparency, equity ownership, crite-
ria for the appointment of directors, board 
structure and composition, accounting and 
auditing, risk management and financial re-
porting. The new code according to CBN was 
developed to complement existing codes in 
the country, and compliance to it is manda-
tory for all banks
Earlier studies by Okike (1994, 1995, 
1998 and 1999) specifically investigated the 
accounting and audit-reporting environment 
in Nigeria, as important elements of corpo-
rate governance. Okike (2007), posited that 
the role of the Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC) has remained perfunctory and ineffec-
tive as some companies and even auditors are 
known to have flouted company legislation 
without being punished. In their review of 
corporate governance in Africa, Okeahalam 
and Akinboade’s (2003) conclude that “the 
adoption of corporate governance principles 
by African countries will be a giant step to-
wards creating safeguards against corruption 
and mismanagement, promote transparency 
in economic life and attracting more domes-
tic and foreign investment”. Ogbechie and 
Koufopoulos (2007) evaluated corporate gov-
ernance issues in public quoted companies in 
Nigeria. The findings of the study show that 
Nigeria public companies have embraced the 
principles of good governance but at differ-
ent stages of adoption of various issues that 
contribute to good governance. Oyejide and 
Soyibo (2010) suggest that for Nigeria to reap 
the benefits of effective corporate governance 
there is need to strengthen the enforcement 
mechanism of the regulatory institutions. 
The role of the Courts are important in this 
regards. The judicial system must have the 
capacity to restore the confidence of the 
shareholders and help him to enforce his 
rights.
Shah and Haq (2007) undertook an em-
pirical study and found that:
“in the cement sector of Pakistan, corporate 
governance structure variables such as percentage 
block holding by individual and family members, 
board size and firm size have a positive impact on 
firm performance. They concluded that the firm’s 
performance is adversely affected if the CEO also 
acts as chairperson of the board of directors; the 
percentage of blocking holdings by financial in-
stitutions has a negative relationship with perfor-
mance; the size of the firm has a positive impact on 
firm performance and the expected leverage is an 
adverse signal for firm performance”
Before the consolidation exercise of 
2006, the Nigerian banks were very weak 
with poor corporate governance, and this af-
fected customers’ confidence in banking op-
erations. The consolidation exercise helped 
to reduce the total numbers of deposit money 
banks from 89 to 25 and to 19 in 2012 (exclud-
ing the three nationalized banks - Enterprise, 
keystone and mainstream banks) through 
mergers and acquisitions and consolidations. 
This development posed serious challeng-
es which the CBN has acknowledged in its 
Code of Corporate Governance (CBN, 2006).
“These challenges include technical incom-
petence of board management; Boardroom squab-
bles among directors; Squabbles among staff and 
management; very few banks have a robust risk 
management system; malpractices and sharp 
practices; insider abuses; rendering false returns 
and concealment of information from examiners; 
ineffectiveness of board/statutory committees and 
inadequate operational and financial controls”.
All existing banks in the country are re-
quired by the code to adopt and enforce well 
articulated codes of ethics and conduct for 
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directors, management and staff and to ren-
der periodic report (Templars, 2006). The key 
highlights of the Codes of corporate gover-
nance of SEC and CBN include:
Separating the roles of the CEO and board 
Chairman; prescription of non-executive and 
executive directors on the board; Improving the 
quality and performance of board membership; 
Introducing merit as criteria to hold top man-
agement position; introducing transparency, due 
process and disclosure requirements; transparen-
cy on financial and non-financial reporting; pro-
tection of shareholder rights and privileges; and 
defining the composition, role and duties of the 
audit committee, etc (Wilson,2006).
However deliberate accounting fraud 
is serious problem of corporate governance 
in the country. Cases of “inaccurate report-
ing and non-compliance with regulatory re-
quirement” (Ibru,2008) and “the prevailing 
incidences of false and misleading financial 
reporting” (Al-faki,2007) by some corporate 
organizations lead to corporate failures. We 
have different shareholders associations reg-
istered with Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC). Etukudo (2000) argued that the share-
holder associations serve the interest of the 
investing public as shareholders who have 
the opportunity to contribute to the formu-
lation of broad corporate policies, there-
by enhancing management accountability. 
However, for effective performance of this 
body, corporate governance institutions need 
to strengthen shareholders activism as a pre-
requisite for effective corporate governance 
and accountability in Nigeria. In Nigeria, 
there is the general weakness of public insti-
tutions, high level of corruption, poor mana-
gerial capacity and total absence of market 
discipline for transparency and accountabil-
ity, which combine to create a seeming lack 
of demand for corporate governance in state-
owned enterprises (Ahmed, 2007).
The corporate governance framework 
also depends on the legal, regulatory, and in-
stitutional environment. In addition factors 
such as business ethics and corporate aware-
ness of the environmental and societal inter-
est of the communities in which a company 
operates will also have an impact on its repu-
tation and its long term success.
key element of a sound corporate gov-
ernance framework in a bank
Hennie and Sonja (2009) expressly state 
the main elements of corporate governance 
in a bank to include the following:
• A well articulated corporate strategy 
against which the overall success and 
the contributions of individuals can 
be measured;
• Setting and enforcing clear assign-
ment of responsibilities, decision 
making authority, and accountabili-
ties appropriate for banks selected 
risk profile;
• Strong financial risk management 
function (independent of business 
lines), adequate internal control sys-
tems (including internal and external 
audit functions), and functional pro-
cess design with the necessary checks 
and balances;
• Adequate corporate values, codes of 
conduct, and other standards of ap-
propriate behavior and effective sys-
tem used to ensure compliance. This 
includes special monitoring of the 
bank’s risk exposure where conflict 
of interests is expected to appear (ex-
ample relationship with affiliated 
parties).
•  Financial and managerial incentives 
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to act in an appropriate manner of-
fered to the board, management, and 
employees, including compensation, 
promotion, and penalties (compen-
sation should be consistent with the 
banks objectives, performance and 
ethical values).
• Transparency and appropriate infor-
mation flows internally to the public.
According to CBN (2006), “No one per-
son should combine the post of Chairman/
Chief Executive Officer of any bank”. No two 
members of the same extended family should 
occupy the position of Chairman and that of 
Chief Executive Officer or Executive Director 
of a bank at the same time. The office of the 
Chief Executive should be held by a differ-
ent person other than the chairman. This is 
because such step could lead to the problem 
of moral hazard and thereby threatening the 
financial sector stability.  Effective corporate 
governance is all about board’s performance. 
The task of growing a corporate entity is the 
work of board of directors. For a board to 
function effectively, it should be composed 
of members who are independent, skilled, 
knowledgeable, experienced and of diverse 
perspectives. In Nigeria there has been a 
high profile case of corporate failure which is 
traceable to weak and ineffective boards. In 
some cases, the board  appear were dormant 
being satisfied with having business cards 
that identify them as board members. Critical 
reviews of the nation’s banking system over 
the years have shown that one of the prob-
lems confronting the sector had been that of 
poor corporate governance. From the clos-
ing reports of banks liquidated between 1994 
and 2003, there were evidences that clearly 
established that poor corporate governance 
led to their failures. A further revelation 
showed that many owners and directors 
abused or misused their privileged positions 
or breached their fiduciary duties by engag-
ing in self serving activities. The abuses in-
cluded granting of unsecured credit facilities 
to owners, directors and related companies 
which in some cases were in excess of their 
banks statutory lending limits in violation of 
the provisions of the law.
Sanusi (2010) contends that the prima-
ry responsibility of keeping individual bank 
sound lies with each banks owner, managers, 
and the board of directors. Together, they 
must establish a framework of internal con-
trols and practices to govern the operations 
of the bank and ensure that it functions in a 
safe and sound manner. Poor internal gover-
nance has been identified as a major factor 
in virtually all known instances of banking 
unsoundness. One basic requirement is that 
persons who control and manage the busi-
ness of banking must be men of integrity, 
above board, trustworthy and must possess 
appropriate skills and experience.
Sanusi (2010), posits that disclosure and 
transparency are key pillars of a corporate 
governance frame work, because they pro-
vide all the stakeholders with the informa-
tion necessary to judge whether or not their 
interest are being served. He sees transpar-
ency and disclosure as an important adjunct 
to the supervisory process as they facili-
tate banking sector market discipline. For 
transparency to be meaningful, information 
should be accessible, timely, relevant and 
qualitative. According to Anameje (2007) as 
cited in Babalola(2010), transparency and 
disclosure of information are key attributes 
of good corporate governance which banks 
must cultivate with new zeal so as to provide 
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stakeholders with the necessary information 
to judge whether their interest are being tak-
en care of. Sanusi (2003) opines that lack of 
transparency undermines the ethics of good 
corporate governance and the prospect for 
effective contingency plan for managing sys-
temic distress.
There are various laws put together  to 
regulate the practice of a particular trade or 
profession in order to protect investors and 
ensure a stable business environment and to 
prevent distress, which in this case concerns 
the banking industry. They are  CBN act 
(1991), Bank and Other Financial Institution 
Act (BOFIA) 1991 as amended, Investment 
and Securities Act (ISA) 1999, The Nigerian 
Deposit Insurance Corporations Act (NDIC) 
1988 as amended and other laws. However 
the basic laws governing all companies oper-
ating in Nigeria is the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA) 1990. The act makes it 
mandatory that all companies operating in 
Nigeria must be registered either as a private 
company or as a public company limited by 
shares. The provisions of the CAMA also re-
quire that the financial statements of each 
company should conform to the accounting 
standards. Specific standards for reporting 
consolidated accounts regarding all or any 
of the subsidiaries of the company must be 
specified and applied as detailed by Unegbu 
(2003).
In Nigeria, the insider’s trading, massive 
and prevalent frauds, mandatory retirement 
of CEOs of banks, due to corrupt practices 
and inefficient rubber-stamped board, have 
combined to signal the absence of or fail-
ure of existing corporate governance struc-
ture. The Company and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) enacted to regulate and balance the 
relationship among the board, shareholders 
and the management including other stake-
holders, failed woefully due to inadequate 
enforcement capacity.
Challenges and Failures of Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria
The challenges and failure of corporate 
governance in Nigeria stems from the cul-
ture of corruption and lack of institutional 
capacity to implement the codes of conduct 
governing corporate governance. Company 
executives enjoy an atmosphere of lack of 
check and balances in the system to engage 
in gross misconducts since investors are not 
included in the governing structure. Policy 
and procedures required to ensure efficient 
internal controls are disregarded, and total 
lack of thorough selection process (of CEO 
and board members – round pegs in square 
holes) remain a challenge in Nigeria. The 
businesses cum shareholders’ interests are 
secondary to the self-interest of board mem-
bers and the management. Limited oppor-
tunities for institutional investors, and near 
zero interest in corporate social investments 
to demonstrate companies’ sense of belong-
ingness as evidenced in environmental pol-
lutions, are clear indications of failure of 
corporate governance. Lack of managerial 
training and capacity development among 
Nigerian executives to manage business risks 
has resulted in huge agency costs, and share-
holders have had to shoulder several avoid-
able agency costs since the board of directors 
usually failed as a monitoring device to mini-
mize agency problems. 
The recent collapse of The Nigerian 
Stock Exchange market is a pointer to a 
system devoid of controls and accountabil-
ity, which resulted in lack of shareholders’ 
interest and confidence in the operating 
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environment. Some Nigerian companies re-
located their operations to more stable and 
vibrant neighboring countries like Ghana 
and South Africa. Failure of corporate gover-
nance in Nigeria has also been traced to lack 
of effective yardsticks to evaluate board and 
management processes and performance, 
since the board sub-committees required to 
be fully independence, especially the audit 
and remuneration committees, are compro-
mised. The auditors/the audit committee of 
the board have been singled out as instru-
ment of fraudulent practices given their 
readiness to cover-up corrupt practices for 
executives in a desperate bid for kick-back, 
and, to retain the audit engagement(s) of 
big clients (Habeeb, 2010). According to the 
code of corporate governance issued by CBN 
(2006), the following are challenges that are 
faced by consolidated banks in respect to the 
adherence to the code.
technical incompetence of board and 
management: in view of the greatly en-
hanced resources of the consolidated entities, 
board members may lack the requisite skills 
and competences to effectively redefine, re-
strategize, restructure, expand and or refocus 
the enlarged entities in the areas of change of 
corporate entities new business acquisitions, 
branch consolidation, expansion and product 
development.
relationship among directors: board-
room squabbles could be an issue due to dif-
ferent business cultures and high ownership 
concentration especially in banks that were 
formerly “one-man” entities. The dominance 
of a “key man” could also emerge with the 
attendant problems.
increased level of risks: currently, very 
few banks have a robust risk management 
system in place. With the huge amount of 
funds that will be available to them and the 
significantly increased legal lending limits, 
banks will be financing more long term mega 
projects in the real sectors of the economy as 
opposed to the existing working capital/trade 
financing. Given the expected significant in-
crease in the level of operation, the banks will 
be facing various kinds of risks which, if not 
well managed, will result in significant loss-
es. The management of risks in a transparent 
and ethical way will thus present some issues 
bordering on corporate governance.
resurgence of high level malpractices: 
to boost income as a result of intense compe-
tition and lack of enough viable projects, mal-
practices may resurface post consolidation. 
Such sharp practices could include round 
tripping of forex, excessive customer charg-
es, falsification of records etc, and adoption 
of unethical methods to poach customers.
The corporate failures which charac-
terized 2000 to 2002 when institutions like 
Enron and WorldCom collapsed brought cor-
porate governance issues to the front burner. 
Arunma (2010) stated thus that “corporate 
failures no doubt drew the world’s atten-
tion to the fact that good corporate gover-
nance was extremely important to corporate 
performance and survival; indeed there is a 
nexus between good corporate governance 
and the preservation of shareholders value, 
safeguarding investors’ assets and promot-
ing financial stability particularly, when gov-
ernance of financial institutions is concerned. 
Indeed good corporate governance has be-
come an important index for institutional in-
vestors’ participation in business enterprises 
and financial markets”. 
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3 Methodology 
Participants and Procedures: The sam-
ple of study consisted of 120 respondents 
who were mainly bank employees amongst 
who are professional experts and invest-
ment analysts, shareholders and customers 
among others. The choice of respondents 
was based on their knowledge and experi-
ence in the industry. Ninety respondents 
finally participated in the study, which rep-
resented 75% response rare. Among the re-
spondents,46(51.1%) represents male and 
44(48.9%) represents  female. Majority of the 
respondent are in the middle age which is be-
tween 31 to 40 years (58%) have been work-
ing with the organization for more than 5 
years and 32% have been working between 
5-10years.Majority of the respondent have 
First degree (57%), while those with Masters 
Degree are 20% and only 23% with diploma 
qualification.
research instruments: The research de-
sign adopted in this study is the case study 
method, in other to have an intensive insight 
of the subject matter. Primary data used is 
the survey technique. This was supplement-
ed with data from secondary sources of infor-
mation. The research was carried out in the 
Nigeria banking industry based on a sam-
ple of four deposit money banks (formerly 
called commercial banks) in Nigeria. Out of 
the One hundred (120) questionnaires that 
were administered on the 4 deposit money 
banks, (30 questionnaire each for the 4 dif-
ferent banks) only 90 questionnaires were 
retrieved. The research work was designed 
in such a way that data was generated from 
the questionnaires personally administered 
to the staffs of the respective banks with a 
high response rate of 75%. The structured 
questionnaire was administered to obtain 
relevant information from conveniently se-
lected respondents within Lagos metropolis 
who showed interest in the subject matter. 
The questionnaire consisted of 20 questions 
in statement forms describing issues opera-
tionalised in the concept of corporate gov-
ernance and bank distress as it relates to 
Nigerian banking industry. Responses were 
measured using Likert five point-scale of; 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The re-
search work was designed in such a way that 
data was generated from the questionnaires 
were personally administered to the staffs of 
the respective banks.
 This study employed the Stratified 
Sampling technique. In stratified sampling, 
the population is categorized into groups 
that are distinctly different from each other 
on relevant variables. Each group is called 
stratum (plural strata). In applying stratified 
sampling, we categorized the population and 
stratified using bank capital. Each group is 
called stratum (plural strata). In this study, 
the elements in a particular stratum are the 
same with respect to the relevant param-
eter (bank capital). The banks are grouped 
into stratum and were selected using simple 
random sampling supported by judgment 
sampling (non-probability) methods. These 
banks were selected using judgmental sam-
pling technique in order to have a represen-
tation of the population. Four sample banks 
were selected and are made up of two old 
generation banks and two new generation 
banks. New generation banks came on board 
in Nigeria from 1989 because of the innova-
tions they introduced. The sample size of 
this research work constitutes four Nigeria 
banks. They include Eko bank, Access bank 
(new) United Bank of Africa and First bank 
of Nigeria (old). 
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Krejcie & Morgan (1970) in Amadii 
(2005) agrees with the sample as they pro-
posed the population proportion of 0.05 as 
adequate to provide the maximum sample 
size required for generalization. To the best 
of the researcher’s judgment, the banks make 
a good representation of the banking indus-
try in Nigeria. The expert opinion was sought 
for in order to validate the content and the 
structure of the questionnaire during the 
pilot study. The method that was used in 
the presentation of data in this study is the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
which contains all the necessary and impor-
tant statistical technique for data analysis. 
For testing the hypothesis, correlation anal-
ysis which measures the degree of relation-
ship between variables was used to analyze 
the result generated from the questionnaire. 
Correlation analysis is a technique used to 
assess the extent to which two sets of obser-
vations or series of data regarding a particu-
lar problem or situation can be regarded as 
positively or negatively related to each other 
by association. Correlation analysis helps in 
determining whether or not two sets of obser-
vation co-vary and as such help to determine 
whether there is any correlation between 
good corporate governance and distress in 
the Nigerian banking sector. Theoretically, 
two sets of data or observations are said to 
be correlated if there is evidence to believe 
that there is a positive or negative associa-
tion in their magnitude and direction. The 
numerical method which entails using the 
coefficient of correlation and Karl Pearson’s 
Product Moment Correlation is used because 
it is a measure of linear relationship between 
two variables X and Y.
4. Discussion of results
hypothesis one  
H0: There is no significant relationship 
between good corporate governance and pre-
vention of bank distress
H1: There is significant relationship be-
tween corporate governance and the preven-
tion of bank distress.
 
 
Corporate 
Governance
Prevention of Bank 
distress
Corporate 
Governance
Pearson Correlation 1 .087
Sig. (2-tailed)  .417
N 90 90
Prevention of Bank 
distress
Pearson Correlation .087 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .417  
N 90 90
Table 4-1: Pearson’s correlation between corporate governance and bank distress correlations
Source: SPSS print out (March 2011)
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Coefficient of determination
The coefficient of determination is given 
by the formula;
C.O.D= r2 x 100
= (0.087)2 x 100
=0.7569 x 100
=75.69%
Where r= Pearson correlation 0.417
Correlation is not significant at 42% because 
it is above 10%
interpretation
The relationship between corporate 
governance and prevention of bank distress 
does not have a significant correlation and 
the correlation coefficient derived from the 
analysis showed significance= 0.417 which 
exceeds significance level of 10%.
Decision
The outcome of the Pearson correlation 
(r=0.087, significance 0.417). It is with this 
regard that the null hypothesis will be ac-
cepted. This simply implies that corporate 
governance has no significant improvement 
on the prevention of bank distress.
hypothesis two
H0: There is no significant relationship 
between practice of good corporate gover-
nance and better performance of banks
H1: there is a significant relationship be-
tween practice of good corporate governance 
and better performance of banks.
 
 
Corporate 
Governance
Prevention of Bank 
distress
Corporate 
Governance
Pearson Correlation 1 .087
Sig. (2-tailed)  .417
N 90 90
Prevention of Bank 
distress
Pearson Correlation .087 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .417  
N 90 90
Table 4-2: Pearson’s correlation between corporate governance and bank performance correlations
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: SPSS print out (March 2011)
interpretation
The correlation coefficient is .304 and 
the level of significance is 1%
The coefficient is .304 x 100= 30.4 since 
0.20≤ r ≤0.50 = moderate relationship, there is 
a moderate relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance and it is 
significant at 1% level of significance.
Decision
From the table above, there is a positive 
relationship between corporate governance 
and bank performance at the level of signifi-
cance at 1%.Therefore we reject the null hy-
pothesis (H0) and accept the alternative (H1). 
This simply implies that corporate gover-
nance has significantly improved the perfor-
mance of the Nigerian banking sector.
5. Conclusions   And 
recommendations
In particular, we know that bank dis-
tress in Nigeria and other economies have 
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been caused in part, by excessive exposure 
concentration, directed lending, lending to 
connected parties and poor credit policy. To 
a large extent, such basic risk management 
failures reflect a break down in corporate 
governance. They reflect poor management 
of conflict of interest, inadequate under-
standing in the board room of key banking 
risks and poor oversight by boards of the 
mechanism for managing their banks, such 
as risk management system and internal au-
dit arrangement. In some cases a lack of truly 
independent directors on the boards of banks 
was also a significant factor in weakening the 
effectiveness of boards. And these problems 
are compounded by poor quality financial 
disclosures and ineffective external audit. 
Adherence to corporate governance is the 
foundation for effective risk management.
It is evident that sound corporate gover-
nance is essential to the wellbeing of a bank 
and stakeholders, particularly its sharehold-
ers and creditors. Practice of corporate gov-
ernance is not just a vital factor at the level 
of Individual Corporation; it is also a critical 
ingredient in curbing distress in banks, pro-
moting and maintaining a sound financial 
system and stability which in turn ensures 
a robust economy. To this end, the federal 
government through the regulatory author-
ity (i.e. central bank of Nigeria and security 
and exchange commission) has taken keen 
interest in reviewing and emphasizing the 
adherence to the year 2011 revised code of 
corporate governance in other to curb future 
bank distress in Nigeria. 
 Recommendations
Based on the theoretical and empirical 
findings in this study the following recom-
mendations are therefore made: 
(1) Since corporate governance has no 
significant improvement on the prevention 
of bank distress; banks should be able to 
demonstrate that rigorous internal policies 
were in place and that procedures existed for 
identifying and managing conflicts of inter-
est to avoid its adverse consequences on their 
customers and other stakeholders. Insider 
abuse, conflict of interest and widespread 
manipulations are  at the heart of a nation’s 
financial sector crisis, this crisis connived at 
or orchestrated by management and board, 
should be captured by internal and external 
auditors and regulators so as not to  reach se-
rious proportions.    
(2) The study shows that corporate gov-
ernance has significantly improved the per-
formance of the Nigerian banking sector. 
Therefore, in addressing the role of corpo-
rate governance in curbing distress the cen-
tral bank should review the fit and proper 
person’s regime in other to ensure that only 
credible persons of impeccable financial, per-
sonal and professional character are allowed 
as major shareholders, directors and manag-
ers of banks. The central bank should also 
strengthen its on-site and off- site supervision 
functions in recognition of the need for an ef-
fective supervision of the banking sector.
(3) To ensure that there is a clear divi-
sion between the chief executive officer and 
the managing directors, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria should enforce and continue to en-
sure compliance to the 10 years term limit for 
banks chiefs. Persons occupying these posi-
tions should be properly approved by the 
apex body i.e. central bank of Nigeria and 
such persons must be knowledgeable in busi-
ness and financial matters with requisite ex-
perience in the banking field.
(4) The banks should establish commit-
tees /departments within their banks so as to 
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oversee the management of risk and credit. 
This is also to forestall any potential risk and 
prevent the bank from any imminent or fu-
ture distress.
(5) Regulatory authorities and other 
stakeholders in the Nigerian financial sector 
need to adopt a zero tolerance posture against 
cases of unsound corporate governance prac-
tices. This will ensure that the banks are well 
run and administered. Identifying, prevent-
ing and managing conflict of interest should 
be at a very heart of corporate governance.
(6) The central bank and relevant pro-
fessional body such as Chartered Institute 
of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN) should ensure 
that bank workers do not hold vital posi-
tion in the banks but rather bankers who are 
proven competent after the completion of the 
relevant professional courses should be giv-
en full backing to operate.
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